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25-04-2006, 01:08 PM
The Line of June 4, 1967
By Frederic C. Hof*
The phrase "the line of June 4, 1967" has been part of the Arab-Israeli peace process lexicon for over five years. Although it encapsulates the extent of the withdrawal demanded of Israel by Syria in the con**** of a peace treaty its meaning has not been defined in published accounts of Israeli-Syrian negotiations. This article seeks to define the line of June 4, 1967, in its historical con****. Its diplomatic definition may, depending on the course of Syrian-Israeli negotiations, be something quite different. As for the historical con****, however, the definition has two parts: the conceptual meaning of the phrase and the ******** of the line itself.
THREE LINES: BOUNDARY, ARMISTICE DEMARCATION, AND JUNE 4, 1967
Conceptually, the line of June 4, 1967, was the confrontation line between Israel and Syria on the day before the outbreak of the June 1967 war. Only along one 15-kilometer stretch did it correspond with the international boundary between Palestine and Syria instituted by Great Britain and France in 1923. Neither did it correspond to the Armistice Demarcation Line agreed to by the parties in 1949. The line of June 4, 1967, was neither a boundary, nor an armistice line, nor anything demarcated in a way recognizable to an attorney, a diplomat, or a surveyor.
The ********s of Israeli and Syrian military units and Jewish and Arab settlements in June 1967 were the results of very recent history. The boundary itself was a product of the post-World War I Anglo-French partition of Ottoman Syria. It had been drawn with water—water for the Jewish Home—very much on the minds of British boundary negotiators. It was demarcated so that all of Lake Tiberias, including a 10-meter wide strip of beach along its northeastern shore, would stay inside Palestine. From Lake Tiberias north to Lake Hula the boundary was drawn between 50 and 400 meters east of the Jordan River, keeping that stream entirely within Palestine. Palestine also received a sliver of land along the Yarmouk River, the Jordan’s largest tributary, out to the town of al-Hamma—today’s Hamat-Gader.
This 1923 boundary was not, however, drawn to facilitate the military defense of northeastern Palestine. The task of successfully defending the boundary against virtually any sort of enemy presented insurmountable problems. Short of establishing positions inside Syria, how could one secure a 10-meter strip of beach, or a thin salient along the Yarmouk, or a narrow strip of Palestine east of the Jordan River, all of which were on ground lying well below the Golan ******s? The Great War allies who accomplished the demarcation surely did not anticipate that their respective clients would be at war within 25 years.
Yet go to war they did, in May 1948. During the initial two months of fighting Syrian forces advanced in several places across the 1923 boundary, most significantly across the Jordan River where they took the Jewish settlement of Mishmar Ha-Yarden. Although Syrian attacks south of Lake Tiberias were repelled, the 10-meter strip of beach and the east bank of the Jordan were theirs by default, as were Palestinian Arab villages east of the lake, such as al-Hamma and Khirbet al-Tawafiq. Syrian forces also established a foothold in the extreme northeastern corner of Palestine, just east of the Jewish settlement of Dan.
During armistice talks under UN auspices in the spring and summer of 1949, Israel sought the removal of all Syrian forces from Palestine/ Israel. Syria demurred, insisting on an armistice line ****d not on an international border, which Syria insisted did not exist, but on the military status quo. The result was a compromise. Under the terms of an armistice signed on July 20, 1949, Syrian forces were to withdraw east of the old Palestine-Syria boundary. Israeli forces were to refrain from entering the evacuated areas, which would become a demilitarized zone, "from which the armed forces of both Parties shall be totally excluded, and in which no activities by military or paramilitary forces shall be permitted."
In essence, therefore, major parts of the armistice line departed from the 1923 boundary and protruded into Palestine/ Israel. There were three distinct, non-contiguous enclaves within Palestine/ Israel—in the extreme northeast between Banias and Dan, on the west bank of the Jordan River near Lake Hula, and the eastern-southeastern shores of Lake Tiberias extending out to al-Hamma—consisting of 66.5 square kilometers of land lying between the 1949 armistice line and the 1923 boundary. These were the three sectors—north, central and south—of the demilitarized zone. The 1923 boundary prevailed as the armistice line in only two places: where it connected the northern and central sectors of the demilitarized zone; and along the 10-meter strip of Lake Tiberias, connecting the central and southern sectors of the demilitarized zone.
FROM 1949 ARMISTICE TO JUNE 4, 1967
Major elements of the line of June 4, 1967, were set in place by war in 1948, armistice in 1949 and, above all, by the failure of the Parties to convert their armistice to a treaty of peace in the early 1950s. As it became increasingly clear that peace was not on the horizon, Israel and Syria both sought to take maximum advantage of the territorial ambiguities left in place by their armistice. This advantage-taking left the armistice itself in a shambles and resulted in an evolving tactical situation, one "snapshot" of which, frozen in time, was the disposition of forces on June 4, 1967.
In 1966 an exasperated UN secretary-general reported that Israel and Syria together had produced some 66,000 official complaints about the conduct of the other, the vast majority of which pertained to alleged violations in the demilitarized zone. There were numerous Israeli complaints of infiltration, murder, mayhem, and *****ing from the Syrian side of the armistice demarcation line. Those Israeli complaints not centering on the demilitarized zone often focused on Syria’s de facto annexation of the 10-meter strip and direct access to Lake Tiberias, behavior explicitly criticized by the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC) of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Syrian complaints most often centered on a theme which Israel was pleased to acknowledge: that Israel acted as if the demilitarized zone were part of Israel-proper.
To catalogue, recount and assess blame for the thousands of violent incidents occurring on the Syria-Israel frontier from 1949 until June 5, 1967, is far beyond the scope of this essay. It will suffice to make several points with which both parties would probably agree.
1. Israel claimed the demilitarized zone as sovereign Israeli territory in which Israel had only "consented to the demilitarization of the areas from which the Syrian army had retreated." Syria, on the other hand, asserted no sovereign claim to land in what had been Palestine. Instead it considered the demilitarized zone essentially as a buffer zone subject to UN supervision, the sovereign definition of which had been deferred indefinitely by the armistice.
2. Starting in the spring of 1951 Israel began to assert its sovereign claim quite actively, using the drainage and reclamation of the Hula swamp—located adjacent to the central sector of the demilitarized zone—to test Syria’s response. Syria opposed the project on the grounds that it would alter military geography in the demilitarized zone to Israel’s advantage and do substantial harm to Palestinian Arab farmers. According to Aryeh Shalev, "The central [Israeli] idea seems to have been to engage in a policy of brinkmanship—forcing Syria either not to interfere or face the risk of military deterioration which could escalate into war—combined with an attempt to strengthen Israeli control in the DZ." In March and April 1951 there was a series of armed clashes when Israeli tractors crossed to the east bank of the Jordan River, which "was under the complete control of the Syrians, as it had been even prior to the signing of the armistice agreement." and when Israeli soldiers, disguised as policemen, attempted—unsuccessfully—to "show the flag" in al-Hamma.
3. The upshot of armed clashes in the spring of 1951 was the informal partition of the demilitarized zone. Israel expelled Arab villagers from the central sector and asserted control of that sector up to the Jordan River. Syria exercised effective control over the east bank portion of the central sector—from Lake Hula to Lake Tiberias—took the dominating high ground—Tel al-Azaziat—in the northern sector and, according to Shalev, "seized areas close to its border—al-Hamma, [K]hirbet al-Tawafiq, al-Nuqeib, [and] the northeastern shore of Tiberias . . ." Although there would be alterations to this partition over the next 16 years—all minor and all at Syria’s expense—the events of 1951 would essentially define the line of June 4, 1967.
4. In 1952 and 1953 Israel and Syria held secret military talks to explore the possibility of formalizing the partition of the demilitarized zone. Although the talks achieved consensus on some major points: a new boundary along the east bank of the Jordan, keeping the river within Israel, partition of the northern sector and southern sectors of the demilitarized zone, and reduction of the 10-meter strip to one meter, keeping Lake Tiberias within Israel, they failed. Syria essentially wanted a new armistice line in order to halt more creeping Israeli annexation of the demilitarized zone, but was not interested in conveying formal recognition to Israel. To the extent that Israel might have been tempted to abandon the 1923 boundary, it might have done so in exchange for a treaty of peace—nothing less. Even in the con**** of a peace treaty, according to Professor Moshe Brawer, a Syrian presence on the water line of the Jordan and Tiberias "would only have been possible if they gave up any riparian rights to the river and lake."
5. From 1953 until June 1967 Israel’s struggle to assert its sovereignty all the way to the 1923 boundary became a game of inches, punctuated by serious armed clashes. In words attributed to the late Moshe Dayan, "more than 80 percent" of the incidents resulted from Israeli provocation involving aggressive agricultural activities, albeit in territory claimed by Israel. Regardless of their genesis, these incidents often involved Syrian *****ing into the demilitarized zone by artillery batteries high above their targets, followed by Israeli attacks on Syrian positions, sometimes within Syria. These incidents, combined with an escalating war of words between Syria and Israel and a general breakdown in Arab-Israeli relations, led to war in June 1967. By June 10, 1967, the line of June 4, 1967 was well to the rear of Israeli forces.
THE LINE OF JUNE 4, 1967 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT
In an interview with the author, the Syrian ambassador to the United States, Walid al-Moualem, stated that Syria has never recognized the 1923 international boundary, that it will indeed make a claim to lands west of that boundary, and that its claim will be consistent with the line of June 4, 1967. He declined, however, to be specific, asserting only that Syria and the UN possess identical maps of the status of Syrian and Israeli forces just before the outbreak of war in June 1967. He did, however, say that: "Sometimes people equate the line of June 4 with the town of al-Hamma. It is true that this is a place held dear by the Syrian people, and I myself have camped there as a Boy Scout. But the line of June 4 is more than al-Hamma. It involves water issues for which I believe fair and equitable solutions can be found."
Water concerns would arise because a drawing of a line representing the status quo of June 4, 1967, would place Syria on the northeastern shore of Lake Tiberias and along the east bank of the Jordan River between Lake Tiberias and the former Lake Hula. According to Professor Brawer, the foremost Israeli expert on the geographical aspects of this matter, Syria held some 18 of the 66.5 kilometers of the demilitarized zone on the eve of war in June 1967.
In a letter to the author dated June 12, 1999, Professor Brawer outlined his understanding of key points along the line of June 4, 1967 as follows: the northern sector of the demilitarized zone was "dominated" by the Syrian position at Tel al-Azaziat, with Israel controlling about one-third of the sector by means of cultivation; "From a short distance south of the former Lake Hula to a short distance north of Lake Kinneret [Tiberias] the River Jordan was in fact the dividing line between Israeli and Syrian held territories; …As to the small demilitarized zone west of the Jordan River, just above its entrance into Lake Kinneret, I assume that the Syrians actually controlled a small part on the eastern fringes of that zone: …The Syrians fully controlled the northeastern shore of Lake Kinneret and the adjacent waters of the lake;" within the southern sector of the demilitarized zone Syria controlled small parcels of land "north of the former village [of] al-Nuqeib, a small area near the village [of] Kafr Hareb and an area west of Upper Khirbet al-Tawafiq" as well as al-Hamma and the entire Yarmouk salient, "up to about three kilometers of the Israeli village [of] Shaar Hagolan."
A boundary settlement exactly reflecting the line of June 4, 1967 would raise, within Israel, water-related concerns first surfaced by Zionist leaders and their British allies during and immediately after the first World War. It may fairly be asked, however, whether the addition of perhaps 20 square kilometers to the Syria of 1923-1948 would raise hydrological issues far transcending those implicit in a settlement ****d on the 1923 boundary itself. In both cases Israel will be concerned with Syrian water management practices on the Golan ******s. In both cases Israel will want assurances concerning Syrian control of the Banias Spring. In both cases—unless Syrian citizens can be kept a tantalizing 10 meters away from Lake Tiberias and 50 meters away from the Jordan River—there would appear to be an issue of Syrian access to and use of water from those bodies.
The sine qua non of any Israeli-Syrian settlement rests on mutually acceptable military security provisions. Security assurances that would permit Israel to return the Golan ******s and retire to the 1923 boundary would surely apply with equal effect to an additional 20 square kilometers. If the problem comes down to water, the solution, under either boundary scenario, might involve—as it did during the Mandate period and during the secret talks of 1952-1953—Israeli ownership of the water combined with access and use provisions for Syrian nationals. Another approach to the issue might involve the following formulation: withdrawal to the line of June 4 by Israel without advance to the line of June 4 by Syria.
Under this scenario Syria might receive al-Hamma, and the new boundary would keep the Banias Spring inside Israel and maintain plenty of space between Syria and the Jordan Valley, including Lake Tiberias. Yet the Israeli side of the new boundary would be completely demilitarized, thus fulfilling the Syrian demand for total Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in June 1967. If, in the 50th anniversary year of their armistice, Syria and Israel are prepared to reach the "ultimate territorial arrangement" anticipated by the ********, there is nothing about the line of June 4, 1967, per se that would obstruct matters. This essay has sought to define the line in historical and geographical terms. It is up to Israel and Syria to determine its political meaning and, assuming agreement in principle, draw a line on the ground.
*Frederic Hof, a partner in Armitage Associates L.C., left government in 1993 as a member of the Senior Executive Service of the United States. Mr. Hof has written extensively on Lebanon and the Israel-Syria track of the peace process ands is the author of Galilee Divided: the Israel-Lebanon Frontier 1916-1984. This article is ****d on a longer monograph to be published this fall by Middle East Insight.
FOOTNOTES
1. A comprehensive statement of Syria’s position may be found in an interview of Syria’s ambassador to the United States, Walid al-Moualem, conducted by Linda Butler, Managing Editor of the Journal of Palestine Studies in the Winter 1997 (Issue 102) edition.
2. See Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: the Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) and Uri Savir, The Process (New York, Random House, 1998).
3. According to Ambassador al-Moualem, use of the date June 4—as opposed to June 9, the date of Israel’s assault on the Golan ******s—is explained by Syria’s reliance on UN Security Council Resolution 242 as the legal basis for its position on the extent of Israeli withdrawal. The resolution calls for "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." The June 1967 war began on the Egyptian front on June 5.
4. A complete **** of the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement appears in N. Bar-Yaacov, The Israel-Syrian Armistice (Jerusalem, Magnes Press, 1967), Appendix I.
5. Security Council Official Records, ******** S/7572, p. 62.
6. Security Council Official Records, ******** S/3343, p. 12.
7. Ibid., p. 22.
8. Aryeh Shalev, The Israel Syria Armistice Regime, 1949-1955 (Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 57.
9. Ibid., pp. 83-84.
10. Ibid., p. 77.
11. Ibid., pp. 135-152.
12. Letter to the author dated July, 6 1999.
13. Rami Tal, "Moshe Dayan: Introspection," Yedi’ot Aharonot, April, 27 1997. FBIS ******** Number FBIS-NES-97, April, 27 1997.
14. Aluf Ben and Akiva Eldar, "Syrian Demand for Withdrawal to Armistice Line Reviewed," Ha’aretz, May, 29 1995, pp. A1-A2, FBIS ******** Number FBIS-NES-9-104.
15. In addition to the letter cited above, Professor Brawer provided the author a map on which he sketched his understanding of areas west of the international boundary controlled by Syria on the eve of war in June 1967. Information provided by Professor Brawer and by Aryeh Shalev—with whom the other corresponded—together with UN ********ation form the basis of the cartographic depiction of the line of June 4, 1967, found in this study.
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Chapter 1
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
________________________________________
Ettienne Hennop and Clare Jefferson
Published in Monograph No 57, August 2001
The Challenge to Control
South Africa's Borders and Borderline
Ettienne Hennop, Clare Jefferson and Andrew McLean
The proliferation of firearms originating from across South Africa’s international borders is a problem identified some years ago by the South African Police Service and the South African government. It is recognised by the government that firearms smuggled across the country’s international borders are playing a role in violent crimes in the country. The SAPS has therefore identified firearms as its number one policing priority since 1996. It has been included in the National Policing Strategy and Objectives since 1995. In the Operational Priorities for the period 2000/2003, the SAPS has listed firearms and the proliferation of firearms as one of their focus points under organised, serious and violent crimes. The National Commissioner of the SAPS, Jackie Selebi, indicated in his speech in August 2000 to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on the proposed Firearms Control Bill that the capacity of the Border Police will be enlarged at the 20 border posts handling most of the movements of firearms in an attempt to address the problems experienced with firearms entering or leaving South Africa. According to the Commissioner, the capacity of other police units will also be increased to address the problem of legal and illegal firearms.1 Internationally, the South African government is becoming more involved in the issue and in some instances, is leading the international debate on small arms proliferation in Southern African.
Sources of firearms entering South Africa illegally
Large numbers of firearms are still in circulation in Southern Africa as a result of the two civil wars in Mozambique and Angola. The failure of peacekeeping operations in Mozambique to disarm former soldiers properly is largely seen as one of the most significant reasons for this. This raises fears that the region could be flooded with firearms in the event of a cease-fire or peace in Angola.
After the end of the civil war in Mozambique, large numbers of firearms and small arms were hidden in arms caches, instead of being handed in by former combatants or collected by the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the country as envisaged. The ONUMOZ (1993-1995) only collected 190 000 weapons of between 0.5 to 6 million weapons estimated to be circulating in the country.2
In Angola, UNAVEM II and III both failed to fulfil their mandate to disarm the warring parties in the country. There are fears in South Africa that this failure may lead to an increased flow of illegal firearms to South Africa when the conflict ends in Angola. News reports have shown that, with the ongoing conflict in Angola, soldiers from the Angolan Army (FAA) have tried to sell automatic firearms to buyers in the northern Namibian region of Kavango.3 The Namibian police have reported a significant surge in firearm-smuggling, with sources indicating that arms originate from Angola.4
It is evident that weapons not collected during peace operations after conflicts have ended up in Southern Africa. These often fall into criminal hands in neighbouring countries like Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and South Africa, and may even have been used to start new conflicts in the region. As Vines puts it:
"although the conflict ended, the networks controlling light weapons supplies simply found new customers, using existing caches and networks to traffic weapons to neighbouring states, specially South Africa."5
Within South Africa, the growing demand for firearms is largely attributed to the rise in violent crime in recent years. The demand for firearms has not been offset by the subsidence in politically motivated violence. There are two main sources of demand for firearms in South Africa.6 After the 1994 elections in South Africa, political violence showed a slight decrease, but the root cause of the tensions between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), especially in KwaZulu-Natal still remain.
Violent crimes involving firearms have increased while crime rates in general have mostly stabilised. Although the number of murders reported since 1994 has been declining, the number of murders committed with a firearm has increased. In 1998, some 12 267 out of 24 875 (49.3%) murders were committed with a firearm, indicating a 41.5% increase from rates recorded for 1994 and 1995. The proportion of robberies committed with a firearm increased slightly from 76% to 79%.7 The increase in crime is not only limited to South Africa, but is also evident in other Southern African countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and Malawi.
There is a strong link between the rising demand for firearms and the rise in violent crimes in South Africa. In 1999, levels of violent crime increased faster than in any other year since 1994. In comparison with 1998, violent crime increased by almost 10%, more than any other crime category.
Most firearms smuggled into South Africa are not meant for common or petty criminals on the street as they can more easily obtain a firearm from local sources. Firearms smuggled into South Africa are mostly meant for organised crime syndicates and for a specific purpose, such as cash-in-transit robberies and political assassinations.
Two of the sources readily able to supply these firearms to criminal groups in South Africa are hidden arms caches in Mozambique and firearms sold in the northern Namibian area of Rundu and Kavango near the border with Angola.
The smuggling routes and networks are in place to move firearms and other illegal goods to the market in South Africa. Some of these routes and pipelines were those used by the liberation movements and rebel groups in Southern Africa in their struggle for freedom and during the civil wars. These existing smuggling routes have been used for some time by organised crime syndicates. Countries like Mozambique and Angola are increasingly used as supply ****s from which illicit firearms and other illegal commodities move to criminals and organised crime groups inside South Africa by criminal elements familiar with the operational mechanisms of these routes and pipelines.
Map 1: South Africa's borderline and the distribution of border posts
Source: Source: SAPS Border Police Head Office, Pretoria.
South African land borders
South African has an extensive land borderline which it shares with six other countries - Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. The total distance of land borders of South Africa is approximately 3 500 km.
There are 52 land border posts in South Africa. Only 19 of these are designated for the movement of commercial goods. The land borders are all rated according to the level of service provided at the border post. The rating ranges from A to C. At an ‘A’ status border post, all three of the main government departments involved in the control of the movement of people and goods across the border post are present. These include Customs and Excise (South African Revenue Service), Immigration (Department of Home Affairs) and the South African Police Service (SAPS). At the ‘B’ border posts, only two of the departments are present, and at the ‘C’ status border posts, only one department is present. The South African border police are present at all land border posts in South Africa (see figure 1).
Figure 1: National distribution of border posts per province
Source: SAPS Border Police Head Office, Pretoria.
Border control before 1994
Prior to 1994, the South African government applied strict movement control measures on people entering or leaving the country. In addition, large numbers of South African Defence Force (SADF) soldiers and South African Police (SAP) officers patrolled its international borders.8 This forced firearm smugglers to create sophisticated smuggling techniques and to use very remote areas on the borders when entering the country with firearms. These were normally well-planned operations, even though firearms were recovered from time to time by the SAP at border posts, inside the country in caches, or while being transported. Smuggling routes were well planned and often remained a complete secret to outsiders. Some of these are still shrouded in secrecy and are used by criminal elements to smuggle arms and other commodities like drugs and vehicles across the South African border.
Border control after 1994
After 1994, the staff complement of the SANDF was scaled down, resulting in the numbers of soldiers being reduced on borders. The SAPS was also downsized as there was no perceptible external threat to the security of South Africa or to the new-found freedom of all South Africans.
Along with the new democratic dispensation in South Africa a new threat emerged. Transnational organised crime syndicates identified the country as an untapped market for their criminal activities. This became evident in the sudden influx of drugs, the greater incidence of prostitution, money-laundering, the sudden increase in organised crimes, particularly violent crimes like vehicle-hijackings and cash-in-transit robberies. The new democracy in South Africa also meant that international investors saw the country as an investment opportunity giving rise to the creation of new employment opportunities. With this came an increase in the flow of illegal immigrants into South Africa. This cannot necessarily be tied to the higher crime levels, but when someone crosses an international border illegally this in itself is a crime. The arrest of illegal female immigrants working as prostitutes in the country also occurred more frequently. Nigerian drug syndicates also started operating in South Africa. Organised crime syndicates are known to use unemployed illegal immigrants, for example, to drive stolen vehicles from South Africa to Mozambique for R2 000 a trip. If a person gets caught, the syndicate simply replaces him with another willing to work for this amount of money and prepared to run the risks associated with it. South Africa also started experiencing an increase in the illegal importation of counterfeit goods into the country. Through these illegal imports, the country loses an estimated R17 billion in uncollected duties per year.9
On borders where the SAP was previously responsible for all control measures - customs, immigration and crime prevention duties - with a large number of officers available to fulfil these tasks, the numbers of SAPS offices and SANDF soldiers were reduced and they were still responsible for all the different duties at some of the border posts. Budgets cuts in both departments seriously hampered the effective execution of those border control duties.
All these factors accompanied by the lack of resources and the gradual degradation of facilities at border posts started to have a negative effect on border control and gave rise to an increase in border-related crimes.
Corruption is another factor starting to become synonymous with border posts and officials responsible for border control activities. Crime syndicates sometimes bribe police, customs, immigration and SANDF officials to turn a blind eye to crime at borders that involved the smuggling of drugs, cars, prostitutes, endangered species products and firearms across South Africa’s international borders.
In view of these constricting factors — of being understaffed, the lack of resources, corruption, long borderlines to patrol and the negative perceptions of border control officials held by some of the communities in the vicinity of border posts - it is not surprising that the morale and attitude of officials at some of the border posts are very negative. This may also be a contributing factor in the decrease of search and seizures figures of the border police.
Research rationale
The South African government has committed itself to the eradication of violent crimes. The South African government has been the leader, with various partners, in the Southern African region in addressing the proliferation of firearms. It has also committed itself to co-operation agreements with some of its neighbours, the training of specialised police units and the setting up of new police structures to address the illegal possession and smuggling of firearms. It has undertaken to improve the working and living conditions at border posts and to provide resources for its border policing units. The government is supported by different government departments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in addressing the poor border controls as already identified in 1996.
The demand for firearms within South Africa will continue for the foreseeable future. Legal firearm owners will insist that they have a need to own a firearm to defend their lives and property against criminal elements. As long as the citizens perceive the government as unable to protect its citizens from criminals and criminal masterminds, the demand will remain. There is some form of control over the legal firearms in South Africa and the government has recently promulgated new legislation to tighten this control. If the pro-gun fraternity can associate itself with the need to be responsible in the way these firearms are managed, it will result in more responsible firearm owners and better control over legal firearms.
The focus of this study, however, is the illegal smuggling of firearms into South Africa, which plays a large role in political and criminal violence in the country. How effective is the border control mechanisms on South African borders? How effective should they be to have an impact on the illegal smuggling of firearms into the country?
Purpose of the research
The main purpose of this research was to make an assessment of the effectiveness of South African border control mechanisms to prevent the illicit trafficking in firearms in to South Africa.
Secondary aims included:
• to identify those points of entry of illegal firearms into South Africa;
• to identify the routes and pipelines used by illegal firearm traffickers to smuggle firearms into South Africa;
• to understand the reasons behind the current state of border controls; and
• to identify training and resource needs which donors could address as part of the implementation programmes of the Southern Africa Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit trafficking and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Draft Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons.
Research problem
Growing concern about the increase in firearm-related crime and injury once more raises questions about the extent to which firearm flows are controlled within South Africa. Although most aspects of firearm ownership and possession are regulated in South Africa, inefficient bureaucratic functions and the low prioritisation of responses to minor transgressions by the criminal justice system hamper policing mechanisms. This impinges on the accuracy of police records of who may legally be in possession of firearms, and people arrested on counts of illegal possession can therefore not be sufficiently penalised by the courts. The extent to which the government controls illegal firearms is therefore the main problem addressed in this study.
As a demonstration of the problem, attention was given to the national land borders, and the extent to which the movement of weapons across these borders was controlled or regulated.
De******ion of methodology
Given the nature of the research problem, it was necessary to use a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods in the project. The qualitative approach allowed for deeper investigation of the research problem, while the quantitative methods provided confirmation of the scope and substance of the problems experienced with policing the borders. The project was divided into three phases: background information gathering; quantitative assessment surveys; and two case studies. The different research processes provided complementary information, which allowed for an holistic review of the research problem, and for the critical appreciation of the dynamics affecting the permeability of the national borders from the official at the border post to the head office level. The use of different types of methods to collect information assisted in the validation of the information collected in the course of the research.
Background information
There are three major aspects concerning the background information that is available on South African land borders. There is significant material available on the topic. The existing literature is extensive and comprehensive. There was little that this study could contribute to the analysis of the national borders as such. However, there was a major lack of the evaluations of the extent to which recommendations of previous reports have been implemented. A startling gap was also evident in the existing literature on the permeability of the South African land borders in terms of controlling the free flow of firearms. Significant research has been commissioned in the past on the state of the national border, and copious recommendations have been published. However, very little of the time invested in research has been realised in fixed improvements along the borders. This raises questions about the utility of the research, and the level of commitment of the government to improve border policing.
There was also a complete absence of evaluations and analyses of the impact of poor border controls on crime and firearm flows. This was disappointing, given the outspoken commitment of the government to issues firearms.
Assessment survey
An opinion survey designed by the ISS was also distributed to all 52 land border posts for completion by police officers on border duty at these posts. The opinion survey was meant to give a valuable reflection on the effectiveness of the mechanisms in place in South Africa to control the illegal flow of firearms and other illegal goods into the country through border posts.
Two different quantitative surveys were undertaken at each of the 52 land border posts. The first survey was completed by the senior police officer in charge, while a second survey was completed by each of the other officers on border duty. Information was therefore collected from two perspectives.
The use of a dual survey was necessary as police officers at many border posts are not on permanent duty. This often results in a low level of understanding of the duties and functions of the border post.
Case studies
Two border areas were selected for more focused research into the operational issues around the permeability of the land border with regard to firearm flows. The two case studies were both on major pipelines, or established routes along which firearms are smuggled. The two areas were also identified because of current and historical factors involving the illegal smuggling of firearms in the areas. Research for the case studies involved field trips to the areas and interviews were conducted with border police officials, the SANDF, community leaders, NGOs involved in the areas, customs and immigration officials and other interested parties such as nature conservation staff. ****d on this selection, the problem of firearm flows could be more acutely studied, and more information would become available for the identification of policing options available to curb the problem.
The two areas selected for the case studies were the South Africa/Namibia border, and the Swaziland/Mozambique/South Africa border.
To ensure that the research could be undertaken in depth, it was necessary to conduct confidential interviews with different individuals in an attempt to assess the situation concerning border controls at ground level. Permission to visit and conduct interviews with SAPS officials at identified border posts was obtained from the SAPS Border Police Unit’s Head Office in Pretoria.
Assumptions and limitations of the research
As a result of the lack of resources — both time and financial — the ISS was unable to undertake more than two case studies along the country’s national borders. However, it is recognised that certain land borders are better patrolled than others, and the dynamics and factors underlying the specifics of such borders are not always captured in the two case studies. However, to minimise the error caused by generalisation, the use of the assessment survey was critical to ensure that a universal picture of the border police structures and resources across all land borders was obtained.
At the outset of the project, the ISS was concerned about the ability and willingness of the SAPS land border police to participate in the study. Clearly, this would impact on the validity of the findings and the ability to survey all border posts. The ISS was also aware of the extreme cutbacks within the SAPS land border police budget, and the high number of vacancies. Regardless of these constraints, the ISS had their full co-operation and assistance in the execution of the study. This was important as the research findings are meant to complement existing initiatives and actions within the SAPS land border police. High priority is placed on making recommendations that are realistic, implementable and within the existing scale of priorities.
When undertaking research into the dynamics and flows of firearms, often very little information is collected at the transit points about these activities. Usually, the origin and destination of firearms have proven to be more valuable. Thus, the research project made no concerted attempt to confirm the regional dynamics of firearm flows at specific border posts. Rather, the relevant background information was gathered from other ISS activities related to this type of information gathering.
Information was only collected from the perspective of the South African authorities, while the permeability of national land borders is clearly also impacted upon by the actions of neighbouring countries. No interviews were undertaken or information collected about neighbouring countries, although some information did emerge, especially in terms of the relationship between the South African border police and their counterparts.
Notes
1. South African Police Service, Submission: Firearm Strategy in support of the Firearm Control Bill, 24 August 2000.
2. M Chachiua, Arms Management Programme: Operations Rachel 1996-1999, ISS Monograph 38, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, June 1999.
3. C Inambao, FAA men nabbed for arms sales, The Namibian, 29 June 2000, <www.africanews. org>; J Potgieter, The price of war and peace: A critical assessment of the disarmament component of United Nations operations in Southern Africa, in V Gamba, Governing arms: The Southern African experience, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2000, pp 29-59.
4. A Vines, The struggle continues: Light weapons destruction in Mozambique, Basic Papers on International Security Issues 25, April 1998, p 1.
5. Potgieter, op cit.
6. EHennop, Firearm related crime: Lead-up to new legislation, Nedcor ISS Crime Index 3(3), 1999, 22-25.
7. M Schönteich, The moratorium on crime figures undermines public trust, Focus, September 2000.
8. The South African Defence Force (SADF) was the **** of the military forces in the country prior to 1994. Its **** was subsequently changed to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Similarly, the police was known as the South African Police (SAP) before 1994, with its **** changed to the South African Police Service (SAPS) after 1994.
9. National Inter-Departmental Structure, Border control: The collective approach at ports of entry, confidential working ********, February 1998, p 3.
By Frederic C. Hof*
The phrase "the line of June 4, 1967" has been part of the Arab-Israeli peace process lexicon for over five years. Although it encapsulates the extent of the withdrawal demanded of Israel by Syria in the con**** of a peace treaty its meaning has not been defined in published accounts of Israeli-Syrian negotiations. This article seeks to define the line of June 4, 1967, in its historical con****. Its diplomatic definition may, depending on the course of Syrian-Israeli negotiations, be something quite different. As for the historical con****, however, the definition has two parts: the conceptual meaning of the phrase and the ******** of the line itself.
THREE LINES: BOUNDARY, ARMISTICE DEMARCATION, AND JUNE 4, 1967
Conceptually, the line of June 4, 1967, was the confrontation line between Israel and Syria on the day before the outbreak of the June 1967 war. Only along one 15-kilometer stretch did it correspond with the international boundary between Palestine and Syria instituted by Great Britain and France in 1923. Neither did it correspond to the Armistice Demarcation Line agreed to by the parties in 1949. The line of June 4, 1967, was neither a boundary, nor an armistice line, nor anything demarcated in a way recognizable to an attorney, a diplomat, or a surveyor.
The ********s of Israeli and Syrian military units and Jewish and Arab settlements in June 1967 were the results of very recent history. The boundary itself was a product of the post-World War I Anglo-French partition of Ottoman Syria. It had been drawn with water—water for the Jewish Home—very much on the minds of British boundary negotiators. It was demarcated so that all of Lake Tiberias, including a 10-meter wide strip of beach along its northeastern shore, would stay inside Palestine. From Lake Tiberias north to Lake Hula the boundary was drawn between 50 and 400 meters east of the Jordan River, keeping that stream entirely within Palestine. Palestine also received a sliver of land along the Yarmouk River, the Jordan’s largest tributary, out to the town of al-Hamma—today’s Hamat-Gader.
This 1923 boundary was not, however, drawn to facilitate the military defense of northeastern Palestine. The task of successfully defending the boundary against virtually any sort of enemy presented insurmountable problems. Short of establishing positions inside Syria, how could one secure a 10-meter strip of beach, or a thin salient along the Yarmouk, or a narrow strip of Palestine east of the Jordan River, all of which were on ground lying well below the Golan ******s? The Great War allies who accomplished the demarcation surely did not anticipate that their respective clients would be at war within 25 years.
Yet go to war they did, in May 1948. During the initial two months of fighting Syrian forces advanced in several places across the 1923 boundary, most significantly across the Jordan River where they took the Jewish settlement of Mishmar Ha-Yarden. Although Syrian attacks south of Lake Tiberias were repelled, the 10-meter strip of beach and the east bank of the Jordan were theirs by default, as were Palestinian Arab villages east of the lake, such as al-Hamma and Khirbet al-Tawafiq. Syrian forces also established a foothold in the extreme northeastern corner of Palestine, just east of the Jewish settlement of Dan.
During armistice talks under UN auspices in the spring and summer of 1949, Israel sought the removal of all Syrian forces from Palestine/ Israel. Syria demurred, insisting on an armistice line ****d not on an international border, which Syria insisted did not exist, but on the military status quo. The result was a compromise. Under the terms of an armistice signed on July 20, 1949, Syrian forces were to withdraw east of the old Palestine-Syria boundary. Israeli forces were to refrain from entering the evacuated areas, which would become a demilitarized zone, "from which the armed forces of both Parties shall be totally excluded, and in which no activities by military or paramilitary forces shall be permitted."
In essence, therefore, major parts of the armistice line departed from the 1923 boundary and protruded into Palestine/ Israel. There were three distinct, non-contiguous enclaves within Palestine/ Israel—in the extreme northeast between Banias and Dan, on the west bank of the Jordan River near Lake Hula, and the eastern-southeastern shores of Lake Tiberias extending out to al-Hamma—consisting of 66.5 square kilometers of land lying between the 1949 armistice line and the 1923 boundary. These were the three sectors—north, central and south—of the demilitarized zone. The 1923 boundary prevailed as the armistice line in only two places: where it connected the northern and central sectors of the demilitarized zone; and along the 10-meter strip of Lake Tiberias, connecting the central and southern sectors of the demilitarized zone.
FROM 1949 ARMISTICE TO JUNE 4, 1967
Major elements of the line of June 4, 1967, were set in place by war in 1948, armistice in 1949 and, above all, by the failure of the Parties to convert their armistice to a treaty of peace in the early 1950s. As it became increasingly clear that peace was not on the horizon, Israel and Syria both sought to take maximum advantage of the territorial ambiguities left in place by their armistice. This advantage-taking left the armistice itself in a shambles and resulted in an evolving tactical situation, one "snapshot" of which, frozen in time, was the disposition of forces on June 4, 1967.
In 1966 an exasperated UN secretary-general reported that Israel and Syria together had produced some 66,000 official complaints about the conduct of the other, the vast majority of which pertained to alleged violations in the demilitarized zone. There were numerous Israeli complaints of infiltration, murder, mayhem, and *****ing from the Syrian side of the armistice demarcation line. Those Israeli complaints not centering on the demilitarized zone often focused on Syria’s de facto annexation of the 10-meter strip and direct access to Lake Tiberias, behavior explicitly criticized by the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC) of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Syrian complaints most often centered on a theme which Israel was pleased to acknowledge: that Israel acted as if the demilitarized zone were part of Israel-proper.
To catalogue, recount and assess blame for the thousands of violent incidents occurring on the Syria-Israel frontier from 1949 until June 5, 1967, is far beyond the scope of this essay. It will suffice to make several points with which both parties would probably agree.
1. Israel claimed the demilitarized zone as sovereign Israeli territory in which Israel had only "consented to the demilitarization of the areas from which the Syrian army had retreated." Syria, on the other hand, asserted no sovereign claim to land in what had been Palestine. Instead it considered the demilitarized zone essentially as a buffer zone subject to UN supervision, the sovereign definition of which had been deferred indefinitely by the armistice.
2. Starting in the spring of 1951 Israel began to assert its sovereign claim quite actively, using the drainage and reclamation of the Hula swamp—located adjacent to the central sector of the demilitarized zone—to test Syria’s response. Syria opposed the project on the grounds that it would alter military geography in the demilitarized zone to Israel’s advantage and do substantial harm to Palestinian Arab farmers. According to Aryeh Shalev, "The central [Israeli] idea seems to have been to engage in a policy of brinkmanship—forcing Syria either not to interfere or face the risk of military deterioration which could escalate into war—combined with an attempt to strengthen Israeli control in the DZ." In March and April 1951 there was a series of armed clashes when Israeli tractors crossed to the east bank of the Jordan River, which "was under the complete control of the Syrians, as it had been even prior to the signing of the armistice agreement." and when Israeli soldiers, disguised as policemen, attempted—unsuccessfully—to "show the flag" in al-Hamma.
3. The upshot of armed clashes in the spring of 1951 was the informal partition of the demilitarized zone. Israel expelled Arab villagers from the central sector and asserted control of that sector up to the Jordan River. Syria exercised effective control over the east bank portion of the central sector—from Lake Hula to Lake Tiberias—took the dominating high ground—Tel al-Azaziat—in the northern sector and, according to Shalev, "seized areas close to its border—al-Hamma, [K]hirbet al-Tawafiq, al-Nuqeib, [and] the northeastern shore of Tiberias . . ." Although there would be alterations to this partition over the next 16 years—all minor and all at Syria’s expense—the events of 1951 would essentially define the line of June 4, 1967.
4. In 1952 and 1953 Israel and Syria held secret military talks to explore the possibility of formalizing the partition of the demilitarized zone. Although the talks achieved consensus on some major points: a new boundary along the east bank of the Jordan, keeping the river within Israel, partition of the northern sector and southern sectors of the demilitarized zone, and reduction of the 10-meter strip to one meter, keeping Lake Tiberias within Israel, they failed. Syria essentially wanted a new armistice line in order to halt more creeping Israeli annexation of the demilitarized zone, but was not interested in conveying formal recognition to Israel. To the extent that Israel might have been tempted to abandon the 1923 boundary, it might have done so in exchange for a treaty of peace—nothing less. Even in the con**** of a peace treaty, according to Professor Moshe Brawer, a Syrian presence on the water line of the Jordan and Tiberias "would only have been possible if they gave up any riparian rights to the river and lake."
5. From 1953 until June 1967 Israel’s struggle to assert its sovereignty all the way to the 1923 boundary became a game of inches, punctuated by serious armed clashes. In words attributed to the late Moshe Dayan, "more than 80 percent" of the incidents resulted from Israeli provocation involving aggressive agricultural activities, albeit in territory claimed by Israel. Regardless of their genesis, these incidents often involved Syrian *****ing into the demilitarized zone by artillery batteries high above their targets, followed by Israeli attacks on Syrian positions, sometimes within Syria. These incidents, combined with an escalating war of words between Syria and Israel and a general breakdown in Arab-Israeli relations, led to war in June 1967. By June 10, 1967, the line of June 4, 1967 was well to the rear of Israeli forces.
THE LINE OF JUNE 4, 1967 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT
In an interview with the author, the Syrian ambassador to the United States, Walid al-Moualem, stated that Syria has never recognized the 1923 international boundary, that it will indeed make a claim to lands west of that boundary, and that its claim will be consistent with the line of June 4, 1967. He declined, however, to be specific, asserting only that Syria and the UN possess identical maps of the status of Syrian and Israeli forces just before the outbreak of war in June 1967. He did, however, say that: "Sometimes people equate the line of June 4 with the town of al-Hamma. It is true that this is a place held dear by the Syrian people, and I myself have camped there as a Boy Scout. But the line of June 4 is more than al-Hamma. It involves water issues for which I believe fair and equitable solutions can be found."
Water concerns would arise because a drawing of a line representing the status quo of June 4, 1967, would place Syria on the northeastern shore of Lake Tiberias and along the east bank of the Jordan River between Lake Tiberias and the former Lake Hula. According to Professor Brawer, the foremost Israeli expert on the geographical aspects of this matter, Syria held some 18 of the 66.5 kilometers of the demilitarized zone on the eve of war in June 1967.
In a letter to the author dated June 12, 1999, Professor Brawer outlined his understanding of key points along the line of June 4, 1967 as follows: the northern sector of the demilitarized zone was "dominated" by the Syrian position at Tel al-Azaziat, with Israel controlling about one-third of the sector by means of cultivation; "From a short distance south of the former Lake Hula to a short distance north of Lake Kinneret [Tiberias] the River Jordan was in fact the dividing line between Israeli and Syrian held territories; …As to the small demilitarized zone west of the Jordan River, just above its entrance into Lake Kinneret, I assume that the Syrians actually controlled a small part on the eastern fringes of that zone: …The Syrians fully controlled the northeastern shore of Lake Kinneret and the adjacent waters of the lake;" within the southern sector of the demilitarized zone Syria controlled small parcels of land "north of the former village [of] al-Nuqeib, a small area near the village [of] Kafr Hareb and an area west of Upper Khirbet al-Tawafiq" as well as al-Hamma and the entire Yarmouk salient, "up to about three kilometers of the Israeli village [of] Shaar Hagolan."
A boundary settlement exactly reflecting the line of June 4, 1967 would raise, within Israel, water-related concerns first surfaced by Zionist leaders and their British allies during and immediately after the first World War. It may fairly be asked, however, whether the addition of perhaps 20 square kilometers to the Syria of 1923-1948 would raise hydrological issues far transcending those implicit in a settlement ****d on the 1923 boundary itself. In both cases Israel will be concerned with Syrian water management practices on the Golan ******s. In both cases Israel will want assurances concerning Syrian control of the Banias Spring. In both cases—unless Syrian citizens can be kept a tantalizing 10 meters away from Lake Tiberias and 50 meters away from the Jordan River—there would appear to be an issue of Syrian access to and use of water from those bodies.
The sine qua non of any Israeli-Syrian settlement rests on mutually acceptable military security provisions. Security assurances that would permit Israel to return the Golan ******s and retire to the 1923 boundary would surely apply with equal effect to an additional 20 square kilometers. If the problem comes down to water, the solution, under either boundary scenario, might involve—as it did during the Mandate period and during the secret talks of 1952-1953—Israeli ownership of the water combined with access and use provisions for Syrian nationals. Another approach to the issue might involve the following formulation: withdrawal to the line of June 4 by Israel without advance to the line of June 4 by Syria.
Under this scenario Syria might receive al-Hamma, and the new boundary would keep the Banias Spring inside Israel and maintain plenty of space between Syria and the Jordan Valley, including Lake Tiberias. Yet the Israeli side of the new boundary would be completely demilitarized, thus fulfilling the Syrian demand for total Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in June 1967. If, in the 50th anniversary year of their armistice, Syria and Israel are prepared to reach the "ultimate territorial arrangement" anticipated by the ********, there is nothing about the line of June 4, 1967, per se that would obstruct matters. This essay has sought to define the line in historical and geographical terms. It is up to Israel and Syria to determine its political meaning and, assuming agreement in principle, draw a line on the ground.
*Frederic Hof, a partner in Armitage Associates L.C., left government in 1993 as a member of the Senior Executive Service of the United States. Mr. Hof has written extensively on Lebanon and the Israel-Syria track of the peace process ands is the author of Galilee Divided: the Israel-Lebanon Frontier 1916-1984. This article is ****d on a longer monograph to be published this fall by Middle East Insight.
FOOTNOTES
1. A comprehensive statement of Syria’s position may be found in an interview of Syria’s ambassador to the United States, Walid al-Moualem, conducted by Linda Butler, Managing Editor of the Journal of Palestine Studies in the Winter 1997 (Issue 102) edition.
2. See Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: the Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) and Uri Savir, The Process (New York, Random House, 1998).
3. According to Ambassador al-Moualem, use of the date June 4—as opposed to June 9, the date of Israel’s assault on the Golan ******s—is explained by Syria’s reliance on UN Security Council Resolution 242 as the legal basis for its position on the extent of Israeli withdrawal. The resolution calls for "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." The June 1967 war began on the Egyptian front on June 5.
4. A complete **** of the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement appears in N. Bar-Yaacov, The Israel-Syrian Armistice (Jerusalem, Magnes Press, 1967), Appendix I.
5. Security Council Official Records, ******** S/7572, p. 62.
6. Security Council Official Records, ******** S/3343, p. 12.
7. Ibid., p. 22.
8. Aryeh Shalev, The Israel Syria Armistice Regime, 1949-1955 (Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 57.
9. Ibid., pp. 83-84.
10. Ibid., p. 77.
11. Ibid., pp. 135-152.
12. Letter to the author dated July, 6 1999.
13. Rami Tal, "Moshe Dayan: Introspection," Yedi’ot Aharonot, April, 27 1997. FBIS ******** Number FBIS-NES-97, April, 27 1997.
14. Aluf Ben and Akiva Eldar, "Syrian Demand for Withdrawal to Armistice Line Reviewed," Ha’aretz, May, 29 1995, pp. A1-A2, FBIS ******** Number FBIS-NES-9-104.
15. In addition to the letter cited above, Professor Brawer provided the author a map on which he sketched his understanding of areas west of the international boundary controlled by Syria on the eve of war in June 1967. Information provided by Professor Brawer and by Aryeh Shalev—with whom the other corresponded—together with UN ********ation form the basis of the cartographic depiction of the line of June 4, 1967, found in this study.
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Chapter 1
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
________________________________________
Ettienne Hennop and Clare Jefferson
Published in Monograph No 57, August 2001
The Challenge to Control
South Africa's Borders and Borderline
Ettienne Hennop, Clare Jefferson and Andrew McLean
The proliferation of firearms originating from across South Africa’s international borders is a problem identified some years ago by the South African Police Service and the South African government. It is recognised by the government that firearms smuggled across the country’s international borders are playing a role in violent crimes in the country. The SAPS has therefore identified firearms as its number one policing priority since 1996. It has been included in the National Policing Strategy and Objectives since 1995. In the Operational Priorities for the period 2000/2003, the SAPS has listed firearms and the proliferation of firearms as one of their focus points under organised, serious and violent crimes. The National Commissioner of the SAPS, Jackie Selebi, indicated in his speech in August 2000 to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on the proposed Firearms Control Bill that the capacity of the Border Police will be enlarged at the 20 border posts handling most of the movements of firearms in an attempt to address the problems experienced with firearms entering or leaving South Africa. According to the Commissioner, the capacity of other police units will also be increased to address the problem of legal and illegal firearms.1 Internationally, the South African government is becoming more involved in the issue and in some instances, is leading the international debate on small arms proliferation in Southern African.
Sources of firearms entering South Africa illegally
Large numbers of firearms are still in circulation in Southern Africa as a result of the two civil wars in Mozambique and Angola. The failure of peacekeeping operations in Mozambique to disarm former soldiers properly is largely seen as one of the most significant reasons for this. This raises fears that the region could be flooded with firearms in the event of a cease-fire or peace in Angola.
After the end of the civil war in Mozambique, large numbers of firearms and small arms were hidden in arms caches, instead of being handed in by former combatants or collected by the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the country as envisaged. The ONUMOZ (1993-1995) only collected 190 000 weapons of between 0.5 to 6 million weapons estimated to be circulating in the country.2
In Angola, UNAVEM II and III both failed to fulfil their mandate to disarm the warring parties in the country. There are fears in South Africa that this failure may lead to an increased flow of illegal firearms to South Africa when the conflict ends in Angola. News reports have shown that, with the ongoing conflict in Angola, soldiers from the Angolan Army (FAA) have tried to sell automatic firearms to buyers in the northern Namibian region of Kavango.3 The Namibian police have reported a significant surge in firearm-smuggling, with sources indicating that arms originate from Angola.4
It is evident that weapons not collected during peace operations after conflicts have ended up in Southern Africa. These often fall into criminal hands in neighbouring countries like Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and South Africa, and may even have been used to start new conflicts in the region. As Vines puts it:
"although the conflict ended, the networks controlling light weapons supplies simply found new customers, using existing caches and networks to traffic weapons to neighbouring states, specially South Africa."5
Within South Africa, the growing demand for firearms is largely attributed to the rise in violent crime in recent years. The demand for firearms has not been offset by the subsidence in politically motivated violence. There are two main sources of demand for firearms in South Africa.6 After the 1994 elections in South Africa, political violence showed a slight decrease, but the root cause of the tensions between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), especially in KwaZulu-Natal still remain.
Violent crimes involving firearms have increased while crime rates in general have mostly stabilised. Although the number of murders reported since 1994 has been declining, the number of murders committed with a firearm has increased. In 1998, some 12 267 out of 24 875 (49.3%) murders were committed with a firearm, indicating a 41.5% increase from rates recorded for 1994 and 1995. The proportion of robberies committed with a firearm increased slightly from 76% to 79%.7 The increase in crime is not only limited to South Africa, but is also evident in other Southern African countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and Malawi.
There is a strong link between the rising demand for firearms and the rise in violent crimes in South Africa. In 1999, levels of violent crime increased faster than in any other year since 1994. In comparison with 1998, violent crime increased by almost 10%, more than any other crime category.
Most firearms smuggled into South Africa are not meant for common or petty criminals on the street as they can more easily obtain a firearm from local sources. Firearms smuggled into South Africa are mostly meant for organised crime syndicates and for a specific purpose, such as cash-in-transit robberies and political assassinations.
Two of the sources readily able to supply these firearms to criminal groups in South Africa are hidden arms caches in Mozambique and firearms sold in the northern Namibian area of Rundu and Kavango near the border with Angola.
The smuggling routes and networks are in place to move firearms and other illegal goods to the market in South Africa. Some of these routes and pipelines were those used by the liberation movements and rebel groups in Southern Africa in their struggle for freedom and during the civil wars. These existing smuggling routes have been used for some time by organised crime syndicates. Countries like Mozambique and Angola are increasingly used as supply ****s from which illicit firearms and other illegal commodities move to criminals and organised crime groups inside South Africa by criminal elements familiar with the operational mechanisms of these routes and pipelines.
Map 1: South Africa's borderline and the distribution of border posts
Source: Source: SAPS Border Police Head Office, Pretoria.
South African land borders
South African has an extensive land borderline which it shares with six other countries - Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. The total distance of land borders of South Africa is approximately 3 500 km.
There are 52 land border posts in South Africa. Only 19 of these are designated for the movement of commercial goods. The land borders are all rated according to the level of service provided at the border post. The rating ranges from A to C. At an ‘A’ status border post, all three of the main government departments involved in the control of the movement of people and goods across the border post are present. These include Customs and Excise (South African Revenue Service), Immigration (Department of Home Affairs) and the South African Police Service (SAPS). At the ‘B’ border posts, only two of the departments are present, and at the ‘C’ status border posts, only one department is present. The South African border police are present at all land border posts in South Africa (see figure 1).
Figure 1: National distribution of border posts per province
Source: SAPS Border Police Head Office, Pretoria.
Border control before 1994
Prior to 1994, the South African government applied strict movement control measures on people entering or leaving the country. In addition, large numbers of South African Defence Force (SADF) soldiers and South African Police (SAP) officers patrolled its international borders.8 This forced firearm smugglers to create sophisticated smuggling techniques and to use very remote areas on the borders when entering the country with firearms. These were normally well-planned operations, even though firearms were recovered from time to time by the SAP at border posts, inside the country in caches, or while being transported. Smuggling routes were well planned and often remained a complete secret to outsiders. Some of these are still shrouded in secrecy and are used by criminal elements to smuggle arms and other commodities like drugs and vehicles across the South African border.
Border control after 1994
After 1994, the staff complement of the SANDF was scaled down, resulting in the numbers of soldiers being reduced on borders. The SAPS was also downsized as there was no perceptible external threat to the security of South Africa or to the new-found freedom of all South Africans.
Along with the new democratic dispensation in South Africa a new threat emerged. Transnational organised crime syndicates identified the country as an untapped market for their criminal activities. This became evident in the sudden influx of drugs, the greater incidence of prostitution, money-laundering, the sudden increase in organised crimes, particularly violent crimes like vehicle-hijackings and cash-in-transit robberies. The new democracy in South Africa also meant that international investors saw the country as an investment opportunity giving rise to the creation of new employment opportunities. With this came an increase in the flow of illegal immigrants into South Africa. This cannot necessarily be tied to the higher crime levels, but when someone crosses an international border illegally this in itself is a crime. The arrest of illegal female immigrants working as prostitutes in the country also occurred more frequently. Nigerian drug syndicates also started operating in South Africa. Organised crime syndicates are known to use unemployed illegal immigrants, for example, to drive stolen vehicles from South Africa to Mozambique for R2 000 a trip. If a person gets caught, the syndicate simply replaces him with another willing to work for this amount of money and prepared to run the risks associated with it. South Africa also started experiencing an increase in the illegal importation of counterfeit goods into the country. Through these illegal imports, the country loses an estimated R17 billion in uncollected duties per year.9
On borders where the SAP was previously responsible for all control measures - customs, immigration and crime prevention duties - with a large number of officers available to fulfil these tasks, the numbers of SAPS offices and SANDF soldiers were reduced and they were still responsible for all the different duties at some of the border posts. Budgets cuts in both departments seriously hampered the effective execution of those border control duties.
All these factors accompanied by the lack of resources and the gradual degradation of facilities at border posts started to have a negative effect on border control and gave rise to an increase in border-related crimes.
Corruption is another factor starting to become synonymous with border posts and officials responsible for border control activities. Crime syndicates sometimes bribe police, customs, immigration and SANDF officials to turn a blind eye to crime at borders that involved the smuggling of drugs, cars, prostitutes, endangered species products and firearms across South Africa’s international borders.
In view of these constricting factors — of being understaffed, the lack of resources, corruption, long borderlines to patrol and the negative perceptions of border control officials held by some of the communities in the vicinity of border posts - it is not surprising that the morale and attitude of officials at some of the border posts are very negative. This may also be a contributing factor in the decrease of search and seizures figures of the border police.
Research rationale
The South African government has committed itself to the eradication of violent crimes. The South African government has been the leader, with various partners, in the Southern African region in addressing the proliferation of firearms. It has also committed itself to co-operation agreements with some of its neighbours, the training of specialised police units and the setting up of new police structures to address the illegal possession and smuggling of firearms. It has undertaken to improve the working and living conditions at border posts and to provide resources for its border policing units. The government is supported by different government departments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in addressing the poor border controls as already identified in 1996.
The demand for firearms within South Africa will continue for the foreseeable future. Legal firearm owners will insist that they have a need to own a firearm to defend their lives and property against criminal elements. As long as the citizens perceive the government as unable to protect its citizens from criminals and criminal masterminds, the demand will remain. There is some form of control over the legal firearms in South Africa and the government has recently promulgated new legislation to tighten this control. If the pro-gun fraternity can associate itself with the need to be responsible in the way these firearms are managed, it will result in more responsible firearm owners and better control over legal firearms.
The focus of this study, however, is the illegal smuggling of firearms into South Africa, which plays a large role in political and criminal violence in the country. How effective is the border control mechanisms on South African borders? How effective should they be to have an impact on the illegal smuggling of firearms into the country?
Purpose of the research
The main purpose of this research was to make an assessment of the effectiveness of South African border control mechanisms to prevent the illicit trafficking in firearms in to South Africa.
Secondary aims included:
• to identify those points of entry of illegal firearms into South Africa;
• to identify the routes and pipelines used by illegal firearm traffickers to smuggle firearms into South Africa;
• to understand the reasons behind the current state of border controls; and
• to identify training and resource needs which donors could address as part of the implementation programmes of the Southern Africa Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit trafficking and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Draft Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons.
Research problem
Growing concern about the increase in firearm-related crime and injury once more raises questions about the extent to which firearm flows are controlled within South Africa. Although most aspects of firearm ownership and possession are regulated in South Africa, inefficient bureaucratic functions and the low prioritisation of responses to minor transgressions by the criminal justice system hamper policing mechanisms. This impinges on the accuracy of police records of who may legally be in possession of firearms, and people arrested on counts of illegal possession can therefore not be sufficiently penalised by the courts. The extent to which the government controls illegal firearms is therefore the main problem addressed in this study.
As a demonstration of the problem, attention was given to the national land borders, and the extent to which the movement of weapons across these borders was controlled or regulated.
De******ion of methodology
Given the nature of the research problem, it was necessary to use a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods in the project. The qualitative approach allowed for deeper investigation of the research problem, while the quantitative methods provided confirmation of the scope and substance of the problems experienced with policing the borders. The project was divided into three phases: background information gathering; quantitative assessment surveys; and two case studies. The different research processes provided complementary information, which allowed for an holistic review of the research problem, and for the critical appreciation of the dynamics affecting the permeability of the national borders from the official at the border post to the head office level. The use of different types of methods to collect information assisted in the validation of the information collected in the course of the research.
Background information
There are three major aspects concerning the background information that is available on South African land borders. There is significant material available on the topic. The existing literature is extensive and comprehensive. There was little that this study could contribute to the analysis of the national borders as such. However, there was a major lack of the evaluations of the extent to which recommendations of previous reports have been implemented. A startling gap was also evident in the existing literature on the permeability of the South African land borders in terms of controlling the free flow of firearms. Significant research has been commissioned in the past on the state of the national border, and copious recommendations have been published. However, very little of the time invested in research has been realised in fixed improvements along the borders. This raises questions about the utility of the research, and the level of commitment of the government to improve border policing.
There was also a complete absence of evaluations and analyses of the impact of poor border controls on crime and firearm flows. This was disappointing, given the outspoken commitment of the government to issues firearms.
Assessment survey
An opinion survey designed by the ISS was also distributed to all 52 land border posts for completion by police officers on border duty at these posts. The opinion survey was meant to give a valuable reflection on the effectiveness of the mechanisms in place in South Africa to control the illegal flow of firearms and other illegal goods into the country through border posts.
Two different quantitative surveys were undertaken at each of the 52 land border posts. The first survey was completed by the senior police officer in charge, while a second survey was completed by each of the other officers on border duty. Information was therefore collected from two perspectives.
The use of a dual survey was necessary as police officers at many border posts are not on permanent duty. This often results in a low level of understanding of the duties and functions of the border post.
Case studies
Two border areas were selected for more focused research into the operational issues around the permeability of the land border with regard to firearm flows. The two case studies were both on major pipelines, or established routes along which firearms are smuggled. The two areas were also identified because of current and historical factors involving the illegal smuggling of firearms in the areas. Research for the case studies involved field trips to the areas and interviews were conducted with border police officials, the SANDF, community leaders, NGOs involved in the areas, customs and immigration officials and other interested parties such as nature conservation staff. ****d on this selection, the problem of firearm flows could be more acutely studied, and more information would become available for the identification of policing options available to curb the problem.
The two areas selected for the case studies were the South Africa/Namibia border, and the Swaziland/Mozambique/South Africa border.
To ensure that the research could be undertaken in depth, it was necessary to conduct confidential interviews with different individuals in an attempt to assess the situation concerning border controls at ground level. Permission to visit and conduct interviews with SAPS officials at identified border posts was obtained from the SAPS Border Police Unit’s Head Office in Pretoria.
Assumptions and limitations of the research
As a result of the lack of resources — both time and financial — the ISS was unable to undertake more than two case studies along the country’s national borders. However, it is recognised that certain land borders are better patrolled than others, and the dynamics and factors underlying the specifics of such borders are not always captured in the two case studies. However, to minimise the error caused by generalisation, the use of the assessment survey was critical to ensure that a universal picture of the border police structures and resources across all land borders was obtained.
At the outset of the project, the ISS was concerned about the ability and willingness of the SAPS land border police to participate in the study. Clearly, this would impact on the validity of the findings and the ability to survey all border posts. The ISS was also aware of the extreme cutbacks within the SAPS land border police budget, and the high number of vacancies. Regardless of these constraints, the ISS had their full co-operation and assistance in the execution of the study. This was important as the research findings are meant to complement existing initiatives and actions within the SAPS land border police. High priority is placed on making recommendations that are realistic, implementable and within the existing scale of priorities.
When undertaking research into the dynamics and flows of firearms, often very little information is collected at the transit points about these activities. Usually, the origin and destination of firearms have proven to be more valuable. Thus, the research project made no concerted attempt to confirm the regional dynamics of firearm flows at specific border posts. Rather, the relevant background information was gathered from other ISS activities related to this type of information gathering.
Information was only collected from the perspective of the South African authorities, while the permeability of national land borders is clearly also impacted upon by the actions of neighbouring countries. No interviews were undertaken or information collected about neighbouring countries, although some information did emerge, especially in terms of the relationship between the South African border police and their counterparts.
Notes
1. South African Police Service, Submission: Firearm Strategy in support of the Firearm Control Bill, 24 August 2000.
2. M Chachiua, Arms Management Programme: Operations Rachel 1996-1999, ISS Monograph 38, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, June 1999.
3. C Inambao, FAA men nabbed for arms sales, The Namibian, 29 June 2000, <www.africanews. org>; J Potgieter, The price of war and peace: A critical assessment of the disarmament component of United Nations operations in Southern Africa, in V Gamba, Governing arms: The Southern African experience, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2000, pp 29-59.
4. A Vines, The struggle continues: Light weapons destruction in Mozambique, Basic Papers on International Security Issues 25, April 1998, p 1.
5. Potgieter, op cit.
6. EHennop, Firearm related crime: Lead-up to new legislation, Nedcor ISS Crime Index 3(3), 1999, 22-25.
7. M Schönteich, The moratorium on crime figures undermines public trust, Focus, September 2000.
8. The South African Defence Force (SADF) was the **** of the military forces in the country prior to 1994. Its **** was subsequently changed to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Similarly, the police was known as the South African Police (SAP) before 1994, with its **** changed to the South African Police Service (SAPS) after 1994.
9. National Inter-Departmental Structure, Border control: The collective approach at ports of entry, confidential working ********, February 1998, p 3.